Last week America lost its innocence. Gone were any illusions about sweet-talking North Korea out of its nuclear ambitions with offers of economic assistance and diplomatic ties. That hope all but died with Pyongyang’s latest snubbing of international inspectors. By secretly removing 300 spent fuel rods from the five-megawatt reactor in Yongbyon, the North Koreans erased all clues about how much plutonium may have been diverted to make bombs. They left little doubt, however, about their intentions. ““Anyone who still believes the North Koreans are using their nuclear program as a bargaining chip has his head in the sand,’’ says a U.S. intelligence official. “"[It] has only one purpose – producing nuclear weapons.’’ Clinton acknowledged as much when he warned he would push for U.N. sanctions, telling reporters in Rome, ““I just don’t think we can walk away from this.''
But what, exactly, does confronting Pyongyang imply? Not, apparently, a sweeping trade embargo of the sort imposed on Serbia. Such tough action can’t be rammed through the U.N. Security Council. Russia prefers to resolve the crisis with an international conference. China, publicly opposed to the idea of sanctions, continues to counsel ““patience and dialogue.’’ Another option is to inflict pain on North Korea incrementally, in what one administration aide calls ““a graduated approach.’’ South Korea, for example, might halt the hundreds of millions of dollars in trade it conducts with the North. Japan could cut off the $1 billion worth of hard currency and goods sent each year by local Koreans to their relatives back home. And China might be persuaded to reconsider the 1.1 million metric tons of oil sent annually to Pyongyang, serving 80 percent of its needs.
But making sanctions stick may prove impossible. Iran, which already ships oil to North Korea, could easily make up the shortfall from Beijing. Food and other necessities can be supplied by rogue entrepreneurs along China’s 400-mile border with North Korea. The Chosensoren – an association of Koreans living in Japan loyal to Pyongyang – has already found a way round an embargo: sending money to the North via Singapore and Hong Kong. Tokyo doesn’t like the thought of having to play policeman.
The problem lies deeper than characteristic reticence. Asian nations downplay Pyongyang’s latest show of defiance. ““The South Koreans don’t see this as a new crisis,’’ says a U.S. official. ““Rather, it’s another convulsion in a very knotty and difficult process.’’ More to the point, says a senior Japanese diplomat, ““no one wants to let [international] inspections standards cause a war on the Korean peninsula.’’ China is quite keen on a nuclear-weapons-free region to the east. But it values peace and stability above disarmament. Beijing worries that sanctions might topple Kim Il Sung’s government and spread the unrest across the border.
The White House seemed to be preparing for every possible outcome. ““We’re not trying to rush into sanctions,’’ said a senior administration official just a day after Clinton threatened a U.N. embargo. At the weekend, talks in Washington with Japan and South Korea resulted in a plea for ““an appropriate response’’ by the Security Council. ““I do not want a lot of saber rattling over this or war talk,’’ said the president, as the standoff with Pyongyang intensified. But with fresh reports of a nearly complete 200-megawatt reactor – capable of producing enough plutonium for 10 to 12 nuclear weapons a year – the Pentagon wasn’t taking any chances. In addition to the six Patriot antimissile batteries, it has quietly shipped Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and tank-killing Apache helicopters to South Korea. The USS Independence, an aircraft carrier on a Pacific exercise, edged closer to the Korean peninsula. ““We don’t want to talk about post-sanctions,’’ says a senior U.S. official. Yet that clearly implies dealing one way or another with a nuclear North Korea.
